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ABSTRACT: Democracy is abstract and murky concept. This is particularly apparent in the wide 
variety of beliefs about democracy held by publics around the globe. Within democracies, political 
parties often define and name themselves by reference to a particular understanding of democracy. 
This paper focuses on this partisan division in understanding democracy. We suggest that parties 
will attract those who share similar beliefs about democracy. Specifically, we look at whether 
differences in beliefs about democracy predict party support in the United States. Examining the 
responses of U.S. participants to the fifth wave of the World Values Survey, we find that 
differences on a number of “essential” aspects of democracy among individuals predict vote intent 
(and party identification). Those more likely to understand democracy as a form of government 
that promotes civil liberties and the redistribution of wealth to protect the vulnerable are more 
likely to vote Democrat. Those who report stronger associations between democracy and both 
religious interpretation of laws and severe punishment of criminals are more likely to vote 
Republican. This research reinforces the idea that policy differences between the two main parties 
in the United States may derive from different understandings of the role of government in society. 
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In the late 1980’s, Fukuyama (1989) argued that we may be witnessing "the end point of 
mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government."  This observation was somewhat prophetic as democracy, at least 
rhetorically, is now the dominant ideology and preferred form of government around the world 
(Norris 1999b); even countries that are by no means democratic often make some claim to be. 
Contrary to Bell (1960), the “exhaustion of political ideas” writ large does not necessarily coincide 
with those writ small; though the ideological war between democratic and non-democratic 
ideologies may be winding down, there is certainly no consensus on the preferred form of sub-
democratic ideology. 
Political parties in democracies emphasize diverse democratic ideologies, and though 
under less proportional electoral systems, such as the single member plurality system used in 
national elections in the United States, these ideologies appear to agree on many issues, there are 
still ideological incongruences between them (Castles and Mair 1984, Huber and Inglehart 1995, 
Budge 2001, Grofman 2004, Klingemann, et al. 2006). Even parties that operate under the 
democratic ideological umbrella express such substantially divergent policy preferences that to 
call all democracy-oriented parties ideologically equivalent is to paint with strokes so broad as to 
obscure politically-relevant ideological diversity. 
Recent literature provides a particularly important impetus for not just the 
acknowledgement of, but also the active investigation of the diversity of democracy-ideologies. 
Variation in democracy-ideologies is not simply an artifact of cross-country disagreement, but also 
of within-country disagreement (Kornberg and Clarke 1994, Miller, et al. 1997, Bratton and Mattes 
2001, Dalton, et al. 2007, Schedler and Sarsfield 2007, Lagos 2008, Bratton and Mattes 2011, 
Canache 2012, Seo and Kinsey 2012). There is frequently disagreement over what democracy 
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actually references even among those who specifically study the concept (e.g., Collier and 
Levitsky 1997, Whitehead 1997, Collier and Adcock 1999, Bell and Staeheli 2001, Markoff 2011). 
Even discussions which predominantly focus on the best way to measure democracy almost 
invariably revert to a debate over how to conceptualize democracy (e.g., Elkins 2000, Cheibub, et 
al. 2010, Møller and Skaaning 2010, Alexander, et al. 2012). Importantly, variation in how we 
understand democracy, expressed in various democracy-ideologies, is important as it potentially 
influences what we consider acceptable policy. Evidence suggests that these beliefs affect how we 
understand human rights (Dryzek 2016), how democratic institutions are designed and 
implemented (cf., Powell 2000, Powell and Vanberg 2000), and the legitimacy and trust we afford 
such institutions ex post (Kornberg and Clarke 1994). 
This paper undertakes a case study of the United States to specifically examine whether 
beliefs about democracy are related to party support. We hypothesize that a party, which expresses 
a given democracy-ideology, attracts electoral support from individuals who perceive the party to 
hold similar beliefs about democracy. Employing data from the fifth wave of the World Values 
Survey, we find that beliefs about democracy are related to party support. 
Evidence that those who support different parties hold different beliefs about democracy 
may help us understand why the most ardent party supporters are so hostile to the alternative 
party’s political agenda: if you believe the other party is violating the rules of the game—i.e., 
acting outside of the parameters of democratic governance—your opposition to their policy is not 
simply a matter of disagreement, but one intended to prevent the other side from violating regime 
principles. We discuss this further in the conclusion. 
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Ideology and Party Preference 
Our primary theoretical position in this paper is that groups of individuals share similar collections 
of political attitudes and beliefs and behave in ways largely consistent with those attitudes and 
beliefs. In other words, we expect that individuals behave in accordance with general ideologies 
that structure their political attitudes, beliefs, and behavior; an expectation built on accumulated 
evidence (e.g., Miller, et al. 1976, Miller and Levitin 1976, Knight 1985, Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 
Miller and Shanks 1996, Alvarez and Nagler 1998, MacKuen, et al. 2003, Jost 2006, Jost, et al. 
2009, Treier and Hillygus 2009, Feldman and Johnston 2014, Carmines and D'Amico 2015). 
Analyses of both attitude and value structures (McClosky and Zaller 1984, Wildavsky 
1987, Swedlow and Wyckoff 2009, Treier and Hillygus 2009, Feldman and Johnston 2014, 
Lupton, et al. 2015) indicate that U.S. political space is comprised of at least two dimensions, often 
referenced in terms of an economic dimension, consisting of issues related to the welfare state and 
government regulation of business, and a social or cultural dimension, consisting of issues related 
to traditional values, civil liberties, and law and order. As a result of multidimensional political 
space constrained by a two-party system, the Democratic and Republican parties are composed of 
coalitions of distinct, yet overlapping, ideologies (cf., Bawn, et al. 2012). The Republican party is 
argued to consist of two different ‘wings’: the first both economically and socially conservative 
(e.g., the various Christian-right and Tea Party groups) and the second economically conservative 
and socially moderate or liberal (Schofield and Miller 2007, Miller and Schofield 2008). The 
Democrats are similarly composed of two groups: those who are both economically and socially 
liberal and those who are economically moderate or conservative and socially liberal (Schofield 
and Miller 2007, Miller and Schofield 2008). Of the four quadrants suggested by a two-
dimensional model of political space, the two political parties are predominantly composed of 
three of the four, overlapping among those who fall into the economically conservative and 
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socially liberal quadrant; only those who are economically liberal and socially conservative—the 
quadrant often identified with the working class (e.g., Lipset 1959, 1960, Napier and Jost 2008)—
are left unrepresented. Each party, then, is composed of a coalition of two distinct yet overlapping 
ideologies: Democrats overlap on the social dimension; Republicans overlap on the economic 
dimension. 
Hypotheses 
As most citizens in most of the world’s countries view democracy as the ideal form of government 
(Klingemann 1999, Inglehart 2003), most ideologies, including those in the U.S., are 
democratically inclined. However, this does not necessitate a single democracy-ideology, as the 
variations in policies held by Conservative, Christian Democratic, and Social Democratic 
(etcetera) parties makes abundantly clear. Both expert judgments (Castles and Mair 1984, Hunt 
and Laver 1992, Huber and Inglehart 1995, Laver and Garry 2000) and quantitative measurement 
of policy programs (Budge 2001, Klingemann, et al. 2006) support not only the assertion that party 
ideologies differ, but also that the ideologies of supporters also differ, and to a substantial degree.  
As we focus on an advanced democracy where support for democratic governance is quite 
high, we do not expect the degree of variation in beliefs about democracy that one might expect 
from a country with less support for democratic governance, such as the Russian Federation (cf., 
Klingemann 1999, 2014). We expect those beliefs which emphasize democratic participation in 
politics and the social equality of individuals will strongly associate with democracy while beliefs 
emphasizing non-democratic intervention in politics will not. Similarly, we expect that most 
individuals will believe that democracy involves at least minimal economic intervention as 
industry regulation and the welfare state have become, to some degree, bound to the idea of 
democratic governance. Our first three hypotheses, then, focus on our sample as a whole: 
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Hypothesis 1: Characteristics which emphasize political participation and social equality 
will be widely believed to be essential to democracy. 
Hypothesis 2: Characteristics emphasizing non-democratic political interventions will be 
widely believed to be non-essential to democracy. 
Hypothesis 3: Characteristics emphasizing economic intervention will be believed to be at 
least moderately essential to democracy. 
Although we expect convergence around the above characteristics, we also expect a 
meaningful degree of variation within the public and we expect party support to be systematically 
related to such. Given the coalitional structure of the dominant U.S. parties, we base our 
expectations around the apparent shared social liberalism of Democratic supporters and the 
economic conservatism of Republican supporters. 
Hypothesis 4: Those who believe that characteristics reflecting social equality are 
more essential to democracy will be more likely to support the Democratic Party than the 
Republican Party. 
Hypothesis 5: Those who believe that characteristics reflecting economic intervention 
are less essential to democracy will be more likely to support the Republican Party than the 
Democratic Party. 
Data and Measurement 
Measuring beliefs about democracy is a complicated project. As democracy can mean various 
things to various people, anything short of an open-ended question could be considered restrictive 
and likely to play to the expectations of the researcher. However, even an open-ended inquiry is 
problematic. The limited motivation of respondents to provide more than an answer or two as well 
as various other reasons (e.g., interview pressures, interviewer effects, accessibility issues 
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associated with question order) may cause a respondent to overlook a potential aspect of 
democracy that would be quite pertinent under other circumstances. Both preselected lists and 
open-ended questions, then, have their drawbacks, but either can be useful for a given research 
question. 
For our purposes, a pre-fabricated list allows comparison of a larger variety of 
characteristics (that individuals may or may not believe are necessary for democracy) than are 
normally coded in open-ended inquiries. Limited responses coded from open-ended questions may 
allow us to compare the primacy of attribution of a characteristic to democracy across individuals 
of differing party preference, but will not allow us to say anything about whether individuals of 
differing party preference believe democracy entails different characteristics, as the absence of a 
response does not equate to the absence of an association. The advantage of the data used here is 
its capacity to reveal whether Republican Party supporters hold relatively different beliefs about 
what democracy entails than do Democratic Party supporters. 
Wave 5 of the World Values Survey (WVS5) provides a unique battery of ten items which 
inquire into individuals’ beliefs about democracy, as well as vote intent and relevant control 
variables. Samples in each country include individuals over the age of 18, with a minimum sample 
size of 1000 individuals. Nationally representative samples are obtained via stratified sampling. 
Data from the U.S. were collected between September 19th and 29th 2006 by Knowledge Networks 
using personal interviews. 1,201 respondents (of a total sample of 1,710) responded to and 
completed the survey; a completion rate of 70.2%. Missing pertinent data reduces the sample to 
1,107 observations. 
For those 1,107 individuals, when asked, “If there were a national election tomorrow, for 
which party on this list would you vote?”, 362 (32.7%) chose “Republican”, 472 (42.6%) chose 
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“Democrat”, and 200 (18.1%) chose “Independent”.1 The remainder of the sample chose “Other” 
or did not answer the question. As our primary focus in this article is examining the different 
beliefs about democracy between Republican Party and Democratic Party supporters, we retain 
only those individuals for analysis whom responded “Republican” or “Democrat”. We exclude 
independents as there is no political manifesto or elite rhetoric which might serve to guide or unite 
the rank-and-file of this group and therefore little reason to assume that independents are a 
relatively coherent group.2 This reduces our sample to 834 observations. 
                                                 
1 The WVS5 also includes a partisanship question: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself 
as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent or don’t you have any strong party loyalty.” 
However, as our theory speaks more to the psychologically weaker concept of party support rather 
than on the psychologically stronger concept of party identity, we choose to focus our analyses on 
the broader vote intent question. Nevertheless, given the obvious relevance of the question, we test 
the robustness of our findings by also analyzing the partisanship question. The results (presented 
in the appendix) are very similar to the results reported in Table 2. 
2 Independents could hypothetically fall anywhere in ideological space and could therefore express 
various non-overlapping ideologies. Independents could be, among other things, closet partisans, 
minor party supporters of the left or right, or people who are disengaged from politics (Klar and 
Krupnikov 2016). In terms of our theory, there are no party-based ideological appeals to attract 
the support of this group and therefore no reason to hypothesize that they hold similar beliefs about 
democracy. Nevertheless, we do expect party supporters to differ from independents: if party 
appeals to specific democracy-beliefs attract those with similar democracy-beliefs, then those who 
do not support either of the main parties should hold distinct democracy-beliefs, even if such are 
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Individuals’ beliefs about democracy are determined via reference to a set of 10 questions. 
These are prefaced with the following:  
Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. 
Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic 
of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of 
democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”. 
Table 1 presents the ten statements that follow this question along with the variable names used to 
reference those items in the remainder of this paper. In terms of the categorical terminology used 
in our hypotheses above, we consider: free elections and referendums as synonymous with political 
participation; civil rights and women’s rights as synonymous with social equality and social 
liberalism; religious interpretation and military intervention as synonymous with non-democratic 
political intervention; and redistribution and unemployment security as synonymous with 
economic intervention and economic liberalism. While criminal punishment is not directly related 
to social equality, its indirect connection via economic and racial considerations (e.g., King and 
                                                 
not coherent within the group of independents. So, while this is certainly relevant to our theory, it 
is not directly relevant to the main focus of the paper. We therefore include an analysis of 
independents alongside party supporters in the appendix. As expected, independents are 
statistically different from both Democrats and Republicans on certain democracy-beliefs. Further, 
as a robustness check to our primary analyses, in the appendix we also include the output of a 
multinomial regression model including independents, using Republicans as the base category. 
The results of the comparison between those who intend to vote Republican and those who intend 
to vote Democrat are substantively identical to those reported in Table 2. 
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Wheelock 2007, Wakefield and Uggen 2010, Western and Pettit 2010) makes it relevant to the 
social liberalism category and therefore subject to our fourth hypothesis, though it will be 
negatively related to such; i.e., a weaker belief in this characteristic is indicative of social 
liberalism. This leaves economic prosperity uncategorized and for which we remain agnostic in 
terms of any expectations. 
<<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>> 
Previous analyses of vote intent suggest a number of additional concepts that may influence 
vote intent (cf., Campbell, et al. 1960, Lewis-Beck, et al. 2008). Further, the very nature of some 
of the beliefs about democracy questions suggest a particular need to account for certain 
influences: e.g., the relationship between the belief that civil rights are essential to democracy and 
vote intent may result from one’s status as a racial minority. The regression analysis below 
therefore controls for a select set of variables that are either known to effect vote intent, may 
influence beliefs about democracy, or both: age, authoritarianism, education, gender, income level, 
Left-Right identification, race, and religiosity.  
Age is a self-reported measure of the respondent’s age at the time of the interview and 
ranges from 18 to 91. Authoritarianism is a formative scale (cf., Singh and Dunn 2013) that follows 
comparative authoritarianism scholars (Stenner 2005, Dunn and Singh 2011, Brandt and Henry 
2012, Dunn and Singh 2014, Roccato, et al. 2014, Dunn 2015) who utilize specific child-rearing 
values questions from the European and/or World Values Surveys to measure an individual's level 
of authoritarianism. This scale is an additive index composed of four questions gauging the 
respondent’s view of desirable qualities to instill in children: independence, imagination, 
respect/tolerance for others, and obedience. Each of the first three items is coded 1 if rejected and 
0 if accepted. The fourth item, obedience, is coded 1 if accepted and 0 if rejected. The items are 
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then summed to form a scale ranging from 0 to 4 with a higher value indicating a higher degree of 
authoritarianism. Gender is a report of the respondent’s gender with males coded as 1 and females 
coded as 2. Education is a 9-point measure of the level of education the respondent has achieved 
with a higher value indicating a higher level of education; in the U.S. sample, this variable ranges 
from 3 to 9. Income is a measure of the respondent’s income ranging from 1 to 10 with a higher 
value indicating a higher level of income. Left-Right identification is obtained from the following 
inquiry: “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your 
views on this scale, generally speaking?”  This variable ranges from 1 to 10 with 1 corresponding 
to the furthest “left” and 10 corresponding to the furthest “right.”  Race (determined by the 
interviewer) is initially coded into 5 categories (white, non-Hispanic; black, non-Hispanic; other, 
non-Hispanic; Hispanic; more than one race, non-Hispanic). We recode this so that white, non-
Hispanic is coded as 1 and all others are coded 0.3 Religiosity is composed of four standardized 
items (due to differing scale ranges) inquiring into a respondent’s religious attitudes (“For each of 
the following, indicate how important it is in your life: Religion”, “Independently of whether you 
attend religious services or not, would you say you are: A religious person, Not a religious person, 
A convinced atheist?”, “How important is God in your life?”) and behavior (“Apart from weddings 
and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?”). This scale generates 
a Cronbach’s 𝛼 of 0.842 with an average inter-item correlation of 0.571. The scale ranges from -
2.637 to 0.820; a higher value indicates a higher level of religiosity. 
                                                 
3 We find substantively identical results if we include dummy variables for white, for black, and 
for Hispanic Americans (with “other” as the omitted reference category). 
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Analyses 
We first examine the distributions of responses to the ten democracy-beliefs items.  Figure 1 
presents histograms for each of the democracy-belief items. In Figure 2, we plot the mean rating 
for each of these items. Consistent with our expectations regarding the distribution of beliefs in 
society, those items that one would expect to be strongly endorsed in an established liberal-
democracy – free elections, referendums, civil rights, and women’s rights – are. Those illiberal 
items we would expect to receive minimal support – religious interpretation and military 
intervention – do so. The items that reference economic issues and criminal punishment score in 
between the illiberal and liberal items. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE>> 
<<INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE>> 
Examining a few items in detail helps illustrate these general characterizations. Consider 
religious interpretation, an item we expect to receive little support: here we see that the mean is 
3.025 and about 42% give a score of zero and more than 90% give a score of five or less, indicating 
very little support for the idea that religious authorities should interpret the laws in democratic 
countries. For civil rights, an item we expect to receive high support, we see that the mean response 
is 8.10 and more than 80% offer a score of six or greater. Other items show more variation in levels 
of support: for example, while the most common response is ten for the criminal punishment item, 
nearly a third of respondents offer a response of five or lower. Likewise, we also observe 
substantial variation in the public’s belief that redistribution is essential to democracy: the modal 
response is five, but 17% offer a response of one and about 10% offer a response of nine or ten; 
about 45% of respondents offer a six or greater while about 55% offer a five or lower for this item. 
In other words, while there is considerable agreement for some of the items, the data do not indicate 
that there is a consensus in the public about what is essential for democracy. 
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Examining the relationship between the individual belief items and party support, we 
estimate a model where vote intent is the dependent variable. Table 2 provides the output of a 
logistic regression model regressing vote intent on beliefs about democracy (reporting both 
coefficients and odds ratios), controlling for other relevant variables. The model output indicates 
that a stronger belief that redistribution, unemployment security, and civil rights are essential to 
democracy predicts a higher likelihood of a Democratic vote intent, while a stronger belief that 
religious interpretation and criminal punishment is essential to democracy predicts a lower 
likelihood of reporting a Democratic vote intent. 
<<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>> 
We further examine the impact of these items by calculating the change in the probability 
of reporting a vote intent for the Democratic Party over the Republican Party. Figure 3 displays 
the impact of the five items with statistically significant coefficients on the probability of reporting 
a Democratic vote intent with 95% confidence intervals. As is clear from the figure, these items 
have a substantively meaningful relationship with vote intent. When the redistribution variable is 
set to its minimum value, the probability of supporting the Democratic Party is 0.505; this increases 
to 0.638 when the variable is at its maximum value. A change in the unemployment security 
variable from the minimum value of 1 to the maximum value of 10 increases the probability of 
reporting a Democratic vote intent from 0.405, favoring the Republican Party, to 0.689, strongly 
favoring the Democratic Party. This relationship is echoed for civil rights: an increase from a 
probability of 0.413 to 0.609. On the other hand, a shift from the minimum to the maximum on the 
religious interpretation variable decreases the probability of reporting a Democratic vote intent 
from 0.597 to 0.460. This relationship is echoed for criminal punishment, where we observe a 
decrease in probability from 0.648 to 0.521. 
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<<INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE>> 
Over all, our analyses largely support our hypotheses. Our first three hypotheses consider 
the sample as a whole. We expect that on average the belief that democracy requires: 1) free 
elections, referendums, civil rights, and women’s rights will be quite high; 2) religious 
interpretation and military intervention will be quite low; 3) redistribution and economic security 
will be moderate. The descriptive analyses of the data support these hypotheses. 
Our fourth hypothesis posits that those who have stronger beliefs that civil rights and 
women’s rights are essential for democracy and a lesser belief that criminal punishment is essential 
for democracy will be more likely to intend to vote Democratic. Our analyses demonstrate that the 
probability of reporting a Democratic vote intent is much higher among those who hold a stronger 
belief that civil rights are essential to democracy. However, this is not the case with women’s 
rights; one’s belief that women’s rights are essential for democracy appears uncorrelated with vote 
intent. Criminal punishment is related to vote intent in the expected direction: those with a weaker 
belief that the severe punishment of criminals is essential for democracy are more likely to report 
a Democratic vote intent. Our fourth hypothesis, then, is predominantly, though not entirely, 
supported. 
Our fifth hypothesis posits that those who have weaker beliefs that economic redistribution 
is essential for democracy will be more likely to report a Republican vote intent. This is born out 
in both items that relate to this issue: redistribution and unemployment security. Weaker support 
for both items correlate with an increased probability of reporting a Republican vote intent.  
Finally, outside of our vote intent-related hypotheses and somewhat surprisingly, we find 
that those who hold a stronger belief that religious interpretation is essential for democracy are 
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more likely to report a Republican vote intent; above and beyond the influence of religiosity on 
this belief. 
Conclusion 
For generations, parties in the U.S. have embraced different beliefs about what democracy entails, 
occasionally expressing such as explicit components of their platforms. One of the initial struggles 
in the U.S. related to how ‘democratic’ the new political system should be (Cohen, et al. 2009). 
Soon after, disagreements arose over federalism and its role in the burgeoning republic (cf., 
Channing 1917, Aldrich 1995). During the period of Jacksonian Democracy, Jackson and his 
fellow partisans extended the suffrage to nearly all adult white males (McCormick 1960, Aldrich 
1995), appealing to populist democratic ideals over the more elitist republican ideals of the past. 
Currently, both the Democratic and Republican parties explicitly tie their economic agenda to 
specific values and principles associated with ‘American democracy’ in order to legitimize their 
policy preferences. That only some of these appeals overlap indicates a divergence in beliefs about 
what American democracy actually entails. 
The Republicans and the Democrats embody differing democracy-ideologies. Yet as 
mainstream parties in an established democracy, these ideologies and those of their supporters tend 
to be fairly liberal-democratic in nature and at least minimally supportive of economic 
redistribution. On average, one may expect respondents to report strong beliefs that liberal and 
participatory characteristics are essential to democracy and a moderate belief that redistribution is 
essential to democracy. However, given the partially distinct ideologies expressed by the two 
parties, we expect that those with divergent vote intents will vary in the strength of their belief in 
certain of these characteristics. We hold two broad expectations: first, individuals will largely hold 
liberal and participatory beliefs about democracy that are also at least somewhat supportive of 
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redistribution; second, individual’s beliefs about democracy’s essential characteristics will be 
reflected in their vote intent. Our analyses support these expectations. 
In general, individuals strongly believe that free elections, civil rights, referendums, and 
women’s rights are essential characteristics of democracy; while religious interpretation and 
military intervention are only weakly associated with democracy. Individuals only moderately 
believe that democracy requires redistribution of wealth and unemployment security. The belief 
that democracy requires criminals to be severely punished is fairly strong, as is the more politically 
neutral belief that democracy requires economic prosperity. 
Five of the ten proposed characteristics of democracy are significantly correlated with vote 
intent. A stronger belief that redistribution, unemployment security, and civil rights are essential 
for democracy is associated with a greater probability of a Democratic vote intent. A stronger 
belief that democracy requires a religious interpretation of laws and the severe punishment of 
criminals predicts a lower probability of a Democratic vote intent. As expected given the 
stereotypical attribution of party policy preferences, central to the Democratic ideological coalition 
is a stronger belief that democracy ensures civil rights and economic security while the Republican 
ideological coalition more strongly believes that democracy requires religiously-guided and 
punitive governance. Importantly, however, supporters of both parties believe that liberal 
characteristics are essential to democracy while mostly dismissing illiberal characteristics. 
As with most cross-sectional survey research, our analyses leave a number of unresolved 
issues. Critically, we cannot confirm our proposed direction of causality. We cannot discern 
whether beliefs about democracy precede vote intent or follow from it or whether both result from 
concepts such as partisan identity or value structures. Without relevant long-term panel data, causal 
attribution will remain theoretical speculation. However, according to the expectancy-value model 
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of attitudes and the theory of planned behavior, individuals’ attitudes tend to follow spontaneously 
from accessible beliefs which then guide behavior (cf., Fishbein 1966, Ajzen and Fishbein 2000). 
Our suggestion that people’s beliefs about democracy, likely in conjunction with none-regime-
based beliefs, determine their policy attitudes and their subsequent vote preference is grounded in 
a good deal of previously accumulated evidence. 
 In this article, we diverge from previous research on democracy-related mental constructs 
(e.g., McClosky and Zaller 1984) by focusing on questions that invite the expression of beliefs 
about democracy rather than attitudes regarding policy preferences. However, we cannot be sure 
that people are indeed separating their beliefs from their attitudes when answering this set of 
questions; it is reasonable to suspect that those who have given little consideration to what 
democracy does or does not entail may, for example, simply substitute their attitude toward civil 
liberties for their belief about whether democracy requires such. 
It is also important to emphasize that we do not wish to suggest that political space in the 
U.S. is unidimensional. By focusing on interparty differences in a two-party system we may give 
the impression of a unidimensional political space. However, consideration of multidimensional 
space is critical in understanding how coalitions affect our analyses. We expect that Republican 
Party supporters will vary more widely on issues of social equality than issues of economic 
intervention while Democratic Party supporters will vary more widely on issues of economic 
intervention than social equality. If this is the case, a proposition we do not test in this paper, this 
would mean that those individuals who fall in the overlapping quadrant are shifting the average 
score of the social-oriented beliefs for the Republican Party supporters and the economic-oriented 
beliefs for the Democratic Party supporters closer to that of the opposing party’s supporters, 
thereby moderating the differences between the parties. Further, it is possible that those who fall 
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into this overlapping quadrant hold distinct beliefs about democracy from their fellow supporters. 
These are certainly good reasons to take greater account of intraparty differences; and we view 
this as an important line of inquiry to be taken forward in future research. 
Herein, we have focused on support for the two major parties in U.S. national politics. 
However, a sizeable portion of the electorate abstains from reporting a preferred party, either in 
terms of vote intent or party identification. For our purposes here, we chose to exclude such 
respondents as there is no hypothetical reason to expect that independents share a coherent 
ideology that would predict, as a group, their beliefs about democracy. Those who choose 
“independent” for their vote intent or party identification may be, among other things, closet 
partisans, minor party supporters of the left or right, or people who are disengaged from politics 
(Klar and Krupnikov 2016). Future research may seek to examine whether such individuals differ 
from traditional party supporters in terms of their democracy-beliefs and the impact of such on 
their (lack of) party support. 
End-of-ideology theses suggest that we largely agree on both the means and ends of society 
and governance. While there is widespread agreement that democracy is the ideal form of regime 
(Norris 1999b), there remains a fair amount of diversity in belief regarding what democracy itself 
requires. For those who intend to vote for one of the two dominant American political parties, there 
appear to be relatively distinct beliefs about what democracy is. Though some of these beliefs 
overlap, they also diverge to a substantial degree. Previous research provides evidence that distrust 
in or dissatisfaction with democratic political institutions is higher among those individuals who 
did not vote for or do not agree with the policy outputs of those currently in power (Miller 1974, 
Miller and Borrelli 1991, Hetherington 1998, Norris 1999a, Anderson and LoTempio 2002, 
Banducci and Karp 2003, Singh, et al. 2012, Singh 2013). The analyses herein suggest that such 
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distrust may originate from a matter-of-degree, rather than a fundamental, disagreement over the 
nature and purpose of democratic governance and may thus be a tractable problem. However, just 
because party supporters do not report extreme associations with the above suggested 
characteristics of democracy, does not mean they do not perceive themselves as radically divergent 
from the opposition (cf., Mackie and Cooper 1984, Mackie 1986, Van Boven, et al. 2012).  
Difference in democracy-beliefs may contribute to perceptions of culture wars in the U.S. 
Numerous scholars have added to the debate on how polarized the U.S. has become in recent 
decades (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, Hetherington 2001, Fiorina, et al. 2006, Layman, 
et al. 2006, Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, Baldassarri and Gelman 2008, Fiorina, et al. 2008, 
Hetherington 2009, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Iyengar, et al. 2012, Van Boven, et al. 2012, 
Prior 2013, Jacoby 2014, Westfall, et al. 2015, Levendusky and Malhotra 2016). Regardless of 
whether we are talking about elites or rank-and-file party supporters, beliefs about democracy are 
likely to inform how one views those on the other side of the aisle. Those whose beliefs about 
democracy are expansive and policy prescriptive are likely to more strongly oppose the other side 
if the other side’s policies violate perceptions of what is democratically acceptable. For example, 
if a Democrat strongly believes that democracy requires civil liberties, any suggested infringement 
of civil liberties on the part of Republicans (or even fellow Democrats) is liable to be met with 
strong opposition. Repeated violations of a group’s beliefs by the opposition may create a 
permanently aggravated relationship and the belief that the opposition is trying to undermine 
democratic institutions. This is exemplified in current political rhetoric as groups often reference 
policies of the party they disagree with as fascist, communist, socialist, or totalitarian; and while 
such rhetoric often makes little sense, especially where distinct ideologies are used by the same 
person to describe the same policy or party, the underlying message appears to be that the target 
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policy or party is undemocratic. Such perspective makes any compromise, or support for any 
compromise, highly unlikely as to do so would condone violating the perceived rules of the game.
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Table 1: Conceptions of democracy items  
  
survey question variable name 
  
Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. redistribution 
Religious authorities interpret the laws. religious interpretation 
People choose their leaders in free elections. free elections 
People receive state aid for unemployment. unemployment security 
The army takes over when government is incompetent. military intervention 
Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression. civil rights 
The economy is prospering. economic prosperity 
Criminals are severely punished. criminal punishment 
People can change the laws in referendums. referendums 
Women have the same rights as men. women's rights 
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Table 2: Logit Model of Vote Intent (Democrat = 1) 
    
 β s.e. O.R. 
    
Redistribution 0.099 0.039 1.104 
Religious Interpretation -0.101 0.049 0.904 
Free Elections -0.093 0.052 0.911 
Unemployment Security 0.210 0.043 1.234 
Military Intervention -0.044 0.037 0.957 
Civil Rights 0.145 0.051 1.156 
Economic Prosperity -0.087 0.050 0.916 
Criminal Punishment -0.097 0.046 0.908 
Referendums -0.017 0.050 0.983 
Women's Rights -0.035 0.060 0.965 
    
Age 0.014 0.006 1.014 
Authoritarianism -0.135 0.095 0.874 
Education -0.050 0.077 0.951 
Gender (female) 0.480 0.186 1.616 
Income -0.034 0.052 0.967 
Left-Right identification -0.650 0.062 0.522 
Religiosity -0.266 0.132 0.767 
Race (white, non-Hispanic) -1.644 0.238 0.193 
    
constant 4.806 0.892 -- 
    
observations 834   
pseudo-r2 0.341     
Note: bolded coefficients are significant at p ≤ 0.05 (one-
tailed). 
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Figure 1: Distributions for the ten beliefs about democracy items. Higher values indicate the item 
is considered more essential. 
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Figure 2: Average rating of each of the ten items with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3: The impact of the five significant democracy items on Pr(Democrat) with 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 presents coefficient estimates and standard errors from a multinomial logistic regression 
where Independents are the base category. These results support our theory in that independents 
appear to possess a distinct ideological profile from both Democrats and Republicans. 
Independents significantly differ from Democrats in that Democrats more strongly believe 
redistribution is essential democracy and less strongly believe that religious interpretation is 
essential to democracy. Independents differ from Republicans in that Republicans less strongly 
believe that unemployment security is essential to democracy and more strongly believe that 
criminal punishment is essential to democracy. 
In order to more directly compare the results fromt this model to those in Table 3, we 
present coefficient estimates and standard errors from a multinomial logistic regression where 
Republicans are the base category in Table A2. This table serves as a robustness check on Table 
3, accounting for independents alongside of party supporters. The results are substantively 
identical to those in Table 3. 
<<INSERT TABLE A1 HERE>> 
<<INSERT TABLE A2 HERE>> 
 Table A3 displays a logistic regression analysis of the party identification question. We 
note that fewer respondents answer the identity question (n = 677) than the vote intent question (n 
= 834). This variable is strongly correlated with the vote intention variable: 𝜒2 = 578.313 (p < 
0.001), 𝜙 = 0.953. It is therefore unsurprising that we see similar results to those reported in Table 
3. The primary difference is that the coefficient for criminal punishment is no longer statistically 
significant. 
<<INSERT TABLE A3 HERE>> 
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Table A1: Multinomial Logit Model of Vote Intent 
     
 Democrat Republican 
 β s.e. β s.e. 
     
Redistribution 0.079 0.039 -0.020 0.044 
Religious Interpretation -0.149 0.050 -0.054 0.053 
Free Elections -0.035 0.052 0.054 0.057 
Unemployment Security 0.081 0.042 -0.106 0.045 
Military Intervention 0.002 0.038 0.059 0.041 
Civil Rights 0.101 0.053 -0.019 0.054 
Economic Prosperity 0.005 0.046 0.075 0.051 
Criminal Punishment 0.019 0.042 0.106 0.048 
Referendums -0.011 0.047 -0.001 0.053 
Women's Rights -0.099 0.060 -0.086 0.065 
     
age 0.005 0.006 -0.009 0.006 
authoritarianism 0.010 0.096 0.173 0.105 
education 0.019 0.074 0.064 0.083 
gender (female) 0.555 0.184 0.094 0.205 
income 0.145 0.052 0.198 0.057 
Left-Right identification -0.241 0.061 0.454 0.066 
religiosity 0.382 0.113 0.649 0.132 
race (white, non-Hispanic) -0.742 0.217 0.925 0.270 
     
constant 0.601 0.862 -4.502 0.970 
     
observations 1034    
pseudo-r2 0.223       
note: bolded coefficients are significant at p ≤ 0.05 (one-tailed); base 
category is Independent 
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Table A2: Multinomial Logit Model of Vote Intent 
     
 Democrat Independent 
 β s.e. β s.e. 
     
Redistribution 0.099 0.038 0.020 0.044 
Religious Interpretation -0.095 0.048 0.054 0.053 
Free Elections -0.088 0.051 -0.054 0.057 
Unemployment Security 0.187 0.040 0.106 0.045 
Military Intervention -0.057 0.036 -0.059 0.041 
Civil Rights 0.120 0.049 0.019 0.054 
Economic Prosperity -0.070 0.047 -0.075 0.051 
Criminal Punishment -0.087 0.043 -0.106 0.048 
Referendums -0.010 0.048 0.001 0.053 
Women's Rights -0.013 0.058 0.086 0.065 
     
age 0.014 0.005 0.009 0.006 
authoritarianism -0.163 0.093 -0.173 0.105 
education -0.045 0.074 -0.064 0.083 
gender (female) 0.461 0.180 -0.094 0.205 
income -0.052 0.050 -0.198 0.057 
Left-Right identification -0.695 0.062 -0.454 0.066 
religiosity -0.267 0.125 -0.649 0.132 
race (white, non-Hispanic) -1.667 0.235 -0.925 0.270 
     
constant 5.103 0.868 4.502 0.970 
     
observations 1034    
pseudo-r2 0.223       
note: bolded coefficients are significant at p ≤ 0.05 (one-tailed); base 
category is Republican 
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Table A3: Logit Model of Party Identity (Democrat = 1) 
    
 β s.e. O.R. 
    
Redistribution 0.157 0.043 1.170 
Religious Interpretation -0.100 0.054 0.904 
Free Elections -0.091 0.055 0.913 
Unemployment Security 0.148 0.045 1.160 
Military Intervention -0.071 0.04 0.931 
Civil Rights 0.165 0.056 1.180 
Economic Prosperity -0.042 0.057 0.958 
Criminal Punishment -0.028 0.051 0.973 
Referendums -0.008 0.055 0.992 
Women's Rights -0.051 0.064 0.950 
    
Age 0.016 0.006 1.016 
Authoritarianism -0.053 0.106 0.949 
Education -0.103 0.085 0.902 
Gender (female) 0.521 0.204 1.684 
Income -0.062 0.054 0.940 
Left-Right identification -0.561 0.063 0.571 
Religiosity -0.435 0.153 0.648 
Race (white, non-Hispanic) -1.753 0.252 0.173 
    
constant 3.610 0.943  
    
observations 667   
pseudo-r2 0.329     
Note: bolded coefficients are significant at p ≤ 0.05 (one-
tailed). 
 
